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In recent years, many employees have gained more control over temporal and
locational aspects of their work via a variety of flexible work arrangements, such as
flexi-time and telehomework. This temporal and locational flexibility of work (TLF) is
often seen as a means to facilitate the combination of work and private life. As such it
has been recommended as a policy to increase the average number of working hours
of part-time workers. To the best of our knowledge, the effectiveness of this policy
instrument has not been tested empirically yet. We therefore analyse whether
flexi-time and telehomework arrangements increase the number of actual, contracted,
and preferred working hours. Based on Dutch household panel data, our results
indicate that the link between TLF and working hours is quite weak. Telehomework is
associated with moderate increases in actual hours, but not in contracted or preferred
hours. Flexi-time generally does not seem to be associated with an increase in hours
worked. Despite positive effects on job satisfaction and working time fit, we do not find
any convincing evidence of a positive effect of TLF on labour supply.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, many employees have gained more control about when, where, and how
long they work. This temporal and locational flexibility of work (TLF), which facili-
tates employees with flexibility in the schedule, location, and duration of their work, is
usually implemented via a variety of flexible work arrangements, such as flexi-time, self-
scheduling, and telehomework (Fagan 2004; Hill et al. 2008; Plantenga 2003; Rau 2003).
This development has been fostered by an increasing relevance of knowledge work and
the service industries in general, by new forms of work organisation, but in particu-
lar by the proliferation of information and communication technology (ICT), which has
facilitated asynchronous and remote exchange of information.
In many debates, TLF is primarily viewed as a means to combine work and private life
and consequently has become highly topical in the policy debate in a number of coun-
tries (see, e.g. CEA 2010; BMFSFJ 2012). As such, TLF arrangements have also become a
common policy recommendation to increase labour supply in order to increase economic
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growth and to prevent labour force shortages in the future (Rürup and Gruescu 2005;
Sociaal-Economische Raad 2011; Taskforce DeeltijdPlus 2010). In environments with rel-
atively high labour force participation rates and a lot of (female) part-time workers, the
main focus is on increasing the number of working hours with more TLF. It has not, to the
best of our knowledge, been tested empirically yet, whether this supposed link between
TLF and increasing working hours actually holds, however.
The aim of this paper is therefore to analyse whether and to what extent TLF arrange-
ments indeed influence labour supply. In particular, we analyse the impact of TLF
arrangements that provide schedule and location flexibility on the number of actual,
contracted, and preferred working hours. The analysis is carried out on the basis of a
Dutch household panel dataset. The Netherlands are a good test case in this context,
because they are a highly developed service society with an excellent ICT infrastructure,
which means that the scope for TLF is relatively high. Increasing working hours of part-
time employees has been a policy concern for some years now (Sociaal-Economische
Raad 2011; Taskforce DeeltijdPlus 2010), and the Dutch labour market is quite flexible
already. Employees in the Netherlands have a legal right to both decrease and increase
their contracted working hours for example.1 Obstacles to adjust working hours are
therefore comparatively low, and contracted hours should adapt relatively quickly to new
conditions, also within existing employment relations.
Our results indicate that the association between TLF and working hours is quite weak.
Telehomework is associated with moderate increases in actual hours, but not in con-
tracted or preferred hours, which implies that telehomework is primarily associated with
more overtime. Flexi-time generally seems to have an ambiguous effect on working hours.
So despite positive effects on job satisfaction and working time fit (see e.g. Possenriede
and Plantenga 2014), we do not find any convincing evidence of a positive effect of TLF
on labour supply.
2 Theoretical framework
Female labour force participation rates have increased tremendously in the Netherlands
in the last two decades. In recent years, they have been around 73 % and thus eight to ten
percentage points above EU average. Average weekly working hours of females, however,
have stagnated at a relatively low 25 hours per week (see Fig. 1). Part-time work is used
extensively to combine work and private life in the Netherlands—private life here refer-
ring to any other responsibility, activity, or event that is not paid work. The resulting low
Fig. 1 Participation rates and average working hours in the EU and the Netherlands, 1992–2011
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number of weekly and annual working hours is considered to be problematic in the face of
an ageing society, the expected labour force shortages, gender equality, and low economic
growth in general. Various policy initiatives to increase female labour supply at the inten-
sive margin have therefore been undertaken, among which calls for more temporal and
locational flexibility. The idea is that more TLF and thus more control over working hours
will improve work-life fit and induce employees to supply more hours to the labour mar-
ket. As a result, arrangements such as flexi-time and telehomework can to some extent
substitute part-time work as a means to reconcile work and private life.
The notion that more TLF may lead to an increase in labour supply has been supported
by surveys in which a considerable share of respondents report that they would be willing
to supply more hours to the labour market if more flexibility options were available. In a
2009 survey for example, 35–41 % of non-participants and 25–39 % of part-time workers
responded that more flexibility would be an important condition to either participate in
or supplymore hours to the labourmarket, respectively (Cloïn et al. 2010). The conditions
mentioned include better reconciliation of working times and private life, finding a job
with the preferred number of hours, working part of the week from home, being able
to take a day off if a family member gets sick, and finding a job closer to home. If these
responses are sincere, more temporal and locational flexibility and a better fit between
work and private life should indeed raise labour supply.
In theory, two potential channels can lead from increased flexibility to more working
hours. The first one concerns a decrease in commuting time, the second a reduction of
schedule constraints and a better match between work and private schedules.
Although commuting can be seen as a prerequisite for paid work, commuting time per
se is unproductive and inefficient. Commuting time can be reduced with flexible working
times, because it is possible to avoid rush hour traffic by commuting at less busy times.
Commuting can even be eliminated altogether when one is working at home. This time
gain can then be spent at work.2
While the theoretical predictions are to some extent dependent on the assumptions
made, a simple model predicts exactly this.3 In a graphical representation (Fig. 2), C
designates the consumption of goods, L the consumption of leisure, and L0 maximum
Fig. 2 Commuting and labour supply
Possenriede et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:16 Page 4 of 34
time available. The line L0A designates non-labour income, IC is the indifference curve,
corresponding to the level of utility obtained by the individual, and BC is the budget line
with slope w, the wage rate. If time has to be spent on commuting, the optimal solution is
situated at the tangency point E1 of the indifference curve with the budget constraint BC1.
Here, the individual would supply L1Lc hours on labour, spend LcL0 = c on commuting,
and enjoy 0L1 hours of leisure.4
If commuting is eliminated, the budget constraint shifts to the right and utility
increases. The optimal solution is now at E2 and leisure time increases by L1L2. At the
same time, labour supply increases by c − L1L2 and is now L2L0. Part of the time gain
due to a reduction in commuting time will thus be spent on additional labour supply. This
result holds unambiguously if we assume leisure and consumption to be normal goods
(Black et al. 2014).5
The existing empirical evidence, however, suggests that the size of the effect of TLF
due to commuting time savings alone is likely to be limited. While there is little direct
evidence on the effects of commuting costs on labour supply, indirect evidence (e.g. that
commuters seem to attach relatively low value to travel time) suggests that the effect of the
length of the commute on labour supply is rather weak (Gibbons andMachin 2006). More
recently, Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010) even found a small positive
effect of commuting on the number of daily and weekly working hours.
A second channel via which more temporal and locational flexibility can lead to an
increase in labour supply is a reduction of schedule constraints and a better match
between schedules of work and private life. Tasks and events of both paid work and pri-
vate life are not distributed randomly over the day and week. Most of the time, they take
place within defined schedules, because in both spheres workers depend on and interact
with other individuals. Work is usually carried out in teams within and across firms and
many workers deal directly with clients and business partners. Goods and services have
to be produced and handled at specific times because they are expected by other work-
ers in the production chain, clients expect them at specific times (e.g. during opening and
business hours), or because the goods and services involved are perishable or otherwise
time-critical. In addition, working hours and schedules are generally limited due to legal
restrictions and social norms. As a result, workers are often constrained in the choice of
their working schedule.
In the same vein, the timing of leisure tasks and activities often depend on others.
The schedules of working parents for example depend on their children’s daycare and
school schedules. Informal care often has to be performed at specific times of the day
(Hassink and van den Berg 2011). Stores, businesses, and public and health services have
limited business and opening hours. Further education classes and recreational activi-
ties (sports, clubs, etc.) take place at designated times. Since daycare, school, office, and
service hours usually cannot be altered by individual workers, they constitute a binding
schedule constraint.
Both work and leisure activities thus impose a schedule constraint on workers, mean-
ing that these activities can only be performed at specific times or within a specified
time frame. Activities therefore have to be coordinated and their schedules matched. This
matching can be achieved more easily the more flexible and controllable schedules are.
More flexibility in work schedule and location should therefore improve the fit between
work and leisure activities, prevent and eliminate time conflicts, and improve allocative
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efficiency (Bosch et al. 1994; Golden 2006). TLF has accordingly been shown to increase
working-time fit and job satisfaction (Possenriede and Plantenga 2014).
The trade-off between working hours and schedules is easily illustrated with an exten-
sion of the standard labour supply model (Golden 1996; 2006). According to the standard
model, an individual’s well-being is determined by his or her consumption and hours of
leisure. This is represented by a utility function (U) with the standard consumption (C)
and leisure (L) arguments. But since utility from work is also dependent on work sched-
ule, location, and their flexibility, we add a schedule parameter (S) to the utility function:
U = U[C, L, S] (1)
S represents both the schedule and location of work as well as their adaptability. Based
on the considerations above, we assume that work schedules and locations that fit in
well with leisure activities provide more utility than those that do not. In addition, flex-
ible schedules and locations provide more utility than inflexible ones, because they are
more adaptable to changing circumstances for instance. Note that this is not much dif-
ferent from the usual assumptions about consumption and leisure in standard labour
economics. Just like we assume that consumption and leisure are normal goods, i.e. that
more consumption and more leisure “is better” in the sense that it provides more utility,
we assume here that more flexibility in work schedule and location (i.e. more control over
timing and location of work) and thus a better schedule and working time fit “is better” as
well.













∂S2 ≤ 0 (2)
Under these general assumptions, workers should be willing to trade leisure time or
income for more flexibility and vice versa (Golden 2006).6
We need to keep in mind, though, that consumption potentially is another channel via
which a trade-off with TLF might take place. Instead of increasing labour supply, workers
may be willing to trade part of their wage or future wage increases for increased flexibility
and better work schedules (Altonji and Paxson 1988; Baughman et al. 2003; Heywood et
al. 2007). This will be addressed in the empirical analysis by controlling for wage.
Based on these considerations, we arrive at the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis. More temporal and locational flexibility of work is associated with an
increase in hours worked.
There are a few reasons to believe, however, that the overall impact of TLF on working
hours is limited and may even be negative in the aggregate.
Employees may for example not be willing to increase labour supply but may just as well
enjoy their improved work-life fit from increased TLF. Labour market imperfections may
allow them to do so, since TLF seems to be primarily distributed among higher-status
jobs with possibly less supply side competition (Felstead et al. 2002; Golden 2008; 2009;
Smulders et al. 2011). Norms and societal preferences may reinforce this trend further,
in the sense that work norms have eroded due to proliferation of part-time work in the
Netherlands (Wielers and Raven 2013) and that it is therefore not “attractive” to increase
working hours (see, e.g. Bosch et al. 2010; Booth and van Ours 2013). Furthermore, tele-
homework may partly be used to just transfer some work home, so working time at the
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office is substituted for working time at home (Noonan and Glass 2012; Peters and van
der Lippe 2007).
TLF may also impose externalities on an employee’s partner at home and colleagues at
work. From a household perspective, an increase in the number of hours (due to the avail-
ability of TLF or otherwise) may at least partially be compensated by a reduction in the
hours of the partner. At work, there may be a trade-off between the match between the
schedules of work and private life for one employee and the match between work sched-
ules of several colleagues. To improve the latter, fixed schedules may act as a coordination
device. So even if TLF is generally available at a workplace, an employee may de facto not
be able to make use of it. Similarly, it might not be viable in certain jobs to supply more
hours, if those hours can only be supplied late in the evening, on weekends, or at home
for example, because those particular jobs require constant interaction with colleagues or
clients.
TLF may finally not be viewed as a means of more control by the employee, if the utili-
sation of TLF is imposed by the employer in order to increase operating hours or save on
office space for example. So themere availability of TLF arrangementsmay not necessarily
imply a better fit between work and private life.
The question of whether TLF increases the supply of working hours is therefore
essentially an empirical matter. One that we are trying to solve in the following sections.
3 Data and variable description
The data for the analysis is taken from the Dutch Labour Supply Panel (Arbeidsaanbod-
panel, AAP), a biennial panel survey of a representative sample of Dutch households
(Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP) 2015).7 The panel survey is conducted to study
developments in labour market behaviour and working conditions in the Netherlands and
covers a broad range of work- and life-course-related items. The target population con-
sists of the Dutch labour force aged 16 to 66 years. The AAP has existed since 1985, but
questions about (tele)homework were first asked in 2002, so only the waves from 2002
onwards are suitable for an analysis of TLF. This means that we have six waves available
for this analysis, for every other year since 2002 to the last publicly available wave from
2012. We restrict the sample to employees (i.e. we exclude self-employed, unemployed,
full-time students, etc.), which results in an unbalanced panel of 20,452 observations from
8720 individuals.
We use flexi-time and telehomework as indicators for TLF. The flexi-time variable was
obtained from the following survey question:
“Can you say whether each of the following characteristics does or does not apply to
the work you do? [...] Determine start- and end-time myself”
The telehomework variable was obtained from the following question:
“Do you work at home every now and then in your current job?”8
We only count those respondents as telehomeworkers who state that they work at home
at least once a week on average.9 On average, 39 % of the respondents in the sample can
determine the start- and end-times of their work and 18 % work at home at least once a
week. The shares of flexi-timers and telehomeworkers are generally larger for male than
for female employees (see Table 1). Over the six waves, 1188 respondents change their
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Table 1 Share of flexi-time and telehomework by year and gender
Male Female Total N
% S.E. % S.E. % S.E.
Flexi-time
2002 36.41 (1.57) 26.72 (1.41) 31.51 (1.07) 1952
2004 45.54 (1.28) 34.37 (1.37) 40.57 (0.95) 2748
2006 43.46 (1.25) 33.52 (1.26) 38.75 (0.91) 3035
2008 47.92 (1.27) 34.73 (1.24) 41.56 (0.90) 3073
2010 44.01 (1.40) 33.12 (1.34) 38.60 (0.99) 2518
2012 48.67 (1.37) 34.50 (1.31) 41.62 (0.98) 2696
Total 44.81 (0.83) 33.12 (0.81) 39.18 (0.60) 16,022
Telehomework
2002 15.98 (1.19) 13.16 (1.09) 14.55 (0.82) 1952
2004 17.37 (0.97) 14.98 (1.02) 16.30 (0.73) 2748
2006 18.79 (0.98) 16.62 (0.98) 17.76 (0.71) 3035
2008 20.19 (1.01) 18.54 (1.01) 19.39 (0.74) 3073
2010 19.72 (1.12) 17.84 (1.08) 18.78 (0.80) 2518
2012 20.83 (1.10) 18.93 (1.08) 19.88 (0.78) 2696
Total 18.94 (0.63) 16.88 (0.64) 17.95 (0.47) 16,022
S.E. standard error of the mean
flexi-time and 845 change their telehomework status (i.e. they were, e.g. working at home
in at least one wave and not working at home in another). The availability and use of
flexi-time and telehomework varies greatly across sectors (see Table 2). This suggests that
job-related factors play an important role here.
We use actual, contracted, and preferred hours as outcome variables. Prior research
has found a positive relationship between telehomework and hours worked (Eldridge and
Wulff Pabilonia 2008; Noonan and Glass 2012; Peters and van der Lippe 2007). This has
been mainly attributed to an increase in work demands and overtime, as well as an expan-
sion of the standard working week via an increase in actual hours (Noonan and Glass
2012; Peters and van der Lippe 2007). If only actual and (unpaid) overtime hours increase
but contracted and preferred hours do not, workers may not benefit from the increase
in working hours through higher income (assuming that the hourly wage would stay the
Table 2 Flexi-time and telehomework by sector
Sector Flexi-time Telehomework N
% S.E. % S.E.
Agriculture 32.31 (4.12) 6.92 (2.23) 130
Industry 39.13 (1.12) 10.71 (0.71) 1886
Construction 31.02 (1.74) 10.48 (1.15) 706
Trade, gastronomy, repair 24.25 (0.92) 8.47 (0.60) 2173
Transport 31.59 (1.47) 6.72 (0.79) 997
Business services 55.20 (0.95) 19.83 (0.76) 2743
Care, welfare 30.44 (0.80) 14.16 (0.61) 3285
Other services 44.19 (1.83) 19.73 (1.46) 740
Government 67.21 (1.18) 16.21 (0.92) 1592
Education 29.66 (1.09) 52.37 (1.19) 1770
Total 39.18 (0.39) 17.95 (0.30) 16,022
Note: Share of employees with flexi-time and telehomework by sector
S.E. standard error of the mean
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same after an increase in contracted hours). Furthermore, the work-life fit of employ-
ees may not increase but rather decrease if preferred hours stay the same. We therefore
not only analyse the impact of TLF on actual working hours but consider contracted and
preferred hours as well.
The actual (only available from 2004 onwards) and contracted hour variables were
obtained from the following survey questions:
“How many hours per week do you actually work on average?” and
“How many hours do you work according to your contract? Overtime-hours should
not be considered.”
The preferred hours variable was derived from the following question:
“Are you satisfied with the current number of contract hours or would you like to work
more or fewer hours? Take into account that your hourly wage does not change and
that others in your household will not work more or fewer hours.” The answer
categories are as follows: “Yes, satisfied with hours; No, I would like to work X MORE
hours per week; No, I would like to work X FEWER hours per week.”
Contracted hours were used as the basis for the preferred hours variable, to which
X hours were added or subtracted depending on whether respondents indicated that
they wanted to work more or fewer hours. On average, employees in the sample actu-
ally work 33.63 h (39.66 and 27.05 h for male and female employees, respectively, see
Table 3). Contracted hours are a little lower at 31.12 h (36.58 h for males and 25.24 h
for females). Preferred hours are again slightly lower but have been slowly increasing for
female employees in the period under consideration (from 23.74 h in 2002 to 25.43 h in
2012; not shown).
In order to rule out confounding factors due to differences in individual, household,
and job characteristics, we add a number of control variables to our models. These are
respondents’ age, marital status, children at home, level of education, work experience,
changes in employment (e.g. promotions and demotions within the same job as well as
job switches), two or more jobs, contract type, level of occupation, number of supervised
employees, sector, firm size, and a time trend. Observations with missing values on any of
these variables are dropped from the analysis by listwise deletion, resulting in a net sample
of 16,022 observations from 7164 individuals. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for
both this net sample and the gross sample (N = 20, 452) without listwise deletions.
4 Empirical analysis
Our analysis starts out with a simple cross-tabulation of the TLF and working hour vari-
ables (Table 5). A comparison of working hours of employees with and without TLF seems
Table 3 Average working hours by gender
Working hours Male Female Total N
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Actual hours 39.66 (0.10) 27.05 (0.13) 33.63 (0.10) 14,046
Contracted hours 36.58 (0.07) 25.24 (0.11) 31.12 (0.08) 16,022
Preferred hours 35.85 (0.08) 25.29 (0.11) 30.76 (0.08) 16,022
Note: Employees’ average working hours by gender
S.E. standard error of the mean
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Gross sample Net sample
Variables Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Min Max
Actual hours 31.32 (0.099) 33.63 (0.096) 0 90
Contracted hours 30.48 (0.077) 31.12 (0.078) 0 91
Preferred hours 30.10 (0.076) 30.76 (0.078) 0 91
Flexi-time 0.38 (0.003) 0.39 (0.004) 0 1
Telehomework 0.18 (0.003) 0.18 (0.003) 0 1
Age 41.16 (0.085) 42.70 (0.088) 16 66
Marital status
Married 0.63 (0.003) 0.68 (0.004) 0 1
Cohabiting 0.12 (0.002) 0.12 (0.003) 0 1
Single 0.25 (0.003) 0.20 (0.003) 0 1
Child(ren) 0.53 (0.003) 0.56 (0.004) 0 1
Education
Primary school 0.03 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0 1
Lower secondary 0.22 (0.003) 0.21 (0.003) 0 1
Higher secondary 0.39 (0.003) 0.39 (0.004) 0 1
Vocational college 0.25 (0.003) 0.27 (0.003) 0 1
Academic 0.10 (0.002) 0.11 (0.002) 0 1
Work experience 20.77 (0.081) 21.24 (0.088) 0 52
Permanent contract 0.82 (0.003) 0.87 (0.003) 0 1
Empl. status change 0.35 (0.003) 0.33 (0.004) 0 1
Second job 0.07 (0.002) 0.07 (0.002) 0 1
Supervised employees
None 0.70 (0.003) 0.69 (0.004) 0 1
1–9 employees 0.20 (0.003) 0.22 (0.003) 0 1
10–49 employees 0.08 (0.002) 0.08 (0.002) 0 1
50 or more employees 0.02 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0 1
Occupational level
Elementary 0.06 (0.002) 0.04 (0.002) 0 1
Lower 0.25 (0.003) 0.21 (0.003) 0 1
Medium 0.35 (0.003) 0.37 (0.004) 0 1
Higher 0.26 (0.003) 0.29 (0.004) 0 1
Scientific 0.08 (0.002) 0.09 (0.002) 0 1
Sector
Agriculture 0.01 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0 1
Industry 0.11 (0.002) 0.12 (0.003) 0 1
Construction 0.04 (0.001) 0.04 (0.002) 0 1
Trade, gastronomy, repair 0.16 (0.003) 0.14 (0.003) 0 1
Transport 0.06 (0.002) 0.06 (0.002) 0 1
Business services 0.16 (0.003) 0.17 (0.003) 0 1
Care, welfare 0.21 (0.003) 0.21 (0.003) 0 1
Other services 0.05 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) 0 1
Government 0.09 (0.002) 0.10 (0.002) 0 1
Education 0.10 (0.002) 0.11 (0.002) 0 1
No. of employees (/1000) 0.53 (0.016) 0.57 (0.018) 0 70
2002 0.15 (0.002) 0.12 (0.003) 0 1
2004 0.16 (0.003) 0.17 (0.003) 0 1
2006 0.19 (0.003) 0.19 (0.003) 0 1
2008 0.18 (0.003) 0.19 (0.003) 0 1
2010 0.16 (0.003) 0.16 (0.003) 0 1
2012 0.16 (0.003) 0.17 (0.003) 0 1
Observations 20,452 16,022
Note: The gross sample comprises the observations of all employees in the sample, the net sample those observations used for
estimation after listwise deletion due to missing values
S.E. standard error of the mean
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Table 5 Average working hours by flexi-time and telehomework
Working hours Flexi-time Telehomework
Yes No Yes No
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Actual hours 36.26 (0.15) 31.86 (0.12) 36.98 (0.15) 31.86 (0.12)
Contracted hours 32.93 (0.11) 29.94 (0.10) 32.98 (0.11) 30.17 (0.10)
Preferred hours 32.32 (0.12) 29.75 (0.10) 32.30 (0.12) 29.98 (0.10)
Note: Employees’ average working hours by flexi-time and telehomework
S.E. standard error of the mean
to support the hypothesis that TLF is associated with increased labour supply. Contracted
and preferred hours are on average 2 to 3 h longer for flex-timers and telehomeworkers
than for their colleagues without those types of TLF. Actual hours are even 5 h longer for
employees with TLF.
Not surprisingly, this finding is supported by simple correlations between the TLF and
working hour variables (Table 6). All correlation coefficients are positive and significantly
different from zero, except for themale sample, where the correlations between telehome-
work and contracted and preferred hours, respectively, are not significant. The correlation
coefficients on actual hours are always larger than those on contracted and preferred
hours and the coefficients on flexi-time are larger than those on telehomework (with one
exception, namely actual hours of female employees). So based on simple descriptives, the
notion that TLF is associated with a longer work duration appears to be supported by the
data.
These simple correlations do not take any confounding factors like individual and job
characteristics into account of course. These are likely to play an important role, how-
ever. Availability and usage of TLF arrangements as well as working hours differ across
jobs, organisations, and industries (see Table 2 for example) as a result of structural dif-
ferences in production processes and institutional settings. Telehomework for instance is
hard to implement in assembly line jobs, while it is a common feature of consultancy jobs
nowadays. Furthermore, the degree of availability depends on employers’ cost and benefit
differentials in the implementation and support of flexibility arrangements. Supervision
and monitoring costs differ between jobs and tasks but are likely to be larger if employ-
ees are not predictably available at the workplace for example. Firm characteristics may
also play a role. In small establishments for example, each member of a team is often seen
as critical to business operations, which is why managers may be more reluctant to allow
Table 6 Pairwise correlations of variables
Actual hours Contracted hours Preferred hours Flexi-time
Total (N = 16022)
Flexi-time 0.189** 0.147** 0.127** 1.000
Telehomework 0.151** 0.061** 0.049** 0.196**
Male (N = 8299)
Flexi-time 0.171** 0.082** 0.060** 1.000
Telehomework 0.161** 0.012 −0.002 0.221**
Female (N = 7723)
Flexi-time 0.127** 0.113** 0.089** 1.000
Telehomework 0.171** 0.091** 0.079** 0.162**
**p < 0.01
Possenriede et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:16 Page 11 of 34
their employees to work at home. Availability and usage of TLF as well as work length are
therefore to a certain extent determined by and dependent on job characteristics, some of
which may not be directly observable. It is therefore necessary to control for job-related
heterogeneity in the analysis.
Individual employee characteristics are also likely to influence both the availability and
utilisation of TLF arrangements. Preferences for working hours and TLF depend both on
changes in individual and household characteristics (marital status, children, etc.), as well
as on the more general intrinsic preferences for work and leisure. These preferences also
influence job choice. Since the availability of TLF arrangements differs between jobs and
organisations, employees with stronger preferences for TLF may sort into firms and jobs
that are more likely to provide TLF arrangements. In addition, employees with prefer-
ences for fewer work hours, e.g. due to private responsibilities, may sort into jobs with
more TLF as well, because they give them more room to combine work and private life.
As a next step in the analysis, we therefore control for individual and job-related het-
erogeneity without putting too much structure on the data. We regress the three working
hours variables as well as the two indicators for TLF, flexi-time, and telehomework,
on the same set of control variables (see Section 3) and calculate correlations between
the residuals from these regressions. This will essentially give us correlation coefficients
between TLF and working hours after controlling for a number of confounding factors.
The regression models are given by the following equation:
Fit = γ ′Zit + δt + αi + it (3)
Fit designates the different outcome variables (flexi-time and telehomework as well as
actual, contracted, and preferred hours, respectively)10, and Zit a vector of control vari-
ables. δt represents time effects, αi is the individual-specific, and it the idiosyncratic error
term. i denominates the individual and t the wave (t is 2 years in this biennial panel). γ
is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
We estimate Eq. 3 with a fixed-effects specification to control for individual-specific
effects. This rules out that individual preferences influence the use of TLF and the num-
ber of working hours at the same time for example. It also controls for time-invariant
job-related heterogeneity.11 Furthermore, we estimate the model for the total sample and
separately for male and female employees, because male and female employees usually
have different non-work responsibilities and react differently to labour market incen-
tives (e.g. Blau and Kahn 2007).12 Standard errors are clustered at the level of individual
employee. After estimating these models, we calculate the residuals from the regressions
(i.e. the term it in Eq. 3) and the correlations between these.
Table 7 shows the pairwise correlations between the residuals. In general, these cor-
relations are small (i.e. ≤ 0.06 and five correlations loose statistical significance) and
much smaller than the unconditional ones (down to a third or less). For the total sample,
there is no significant correlation between flexi-time and contracted or preferred hours,
and a small correlation (0.017) between flexi-time and actual hours. For male employ-
ees, the correlation between flexi-time and actual hours remains positive but is less than
a fourth of the original correlation (0.039 vs. 0.171). For the female sample, the correla-
tions between flexi-time and contracted or preferred hours even turn out to be negative.
The correlations between telehomework and actual hours are positive and significantly
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Table 7 Pairwise correlations of residuals after fixed-effects estimation
Actual hours Contracted hours Preferred hours Flexi-time
Total (N = 16022)
Flexi-time 0.017* −0.007 −0.003 1.000
Telehomework 0.053** 0.020* 0.020* 0.043**
Male (N = 8299)
Flexi-time 0.039** 0.014 0.018 1.000
Telehomework 0.041** 0.001 0.011 0.040**
Female (N = 7723)
Flexi-time −0.008 −0.027* −0.029* 1.000
Telehomework 0.060** 0.029** 0.024* 0.044**
Note: See Tables 11 and 12 in the Appendix for regressors used and parameter estimates
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
different from zero for all samples. For contracted and preferred hours, the correlations
with telehomework are statistically insignificant for the male sample.
These results imply that much of the raw correlation between working hours and TLF
arrangements is due to individual and job-related heterogeneity. After controlling for this
heterogeneity, the correlations between flexi-time and work hours are ambiguous, and
the correlations between telehomework and work hours are generally small and positive.
Ideally though, we would also like to quantify the relative effects of both TLF arrange-
ments on working hours. We therefore estimate a simple model in which working hours
depend on whether employees have flexible working times or can work at home. This
model allows us to estimate the relative effects of both TLF arrangements at the same
time. It also allows us to easily estimate the effects for different sub-samples. The model
looks as follows:
Hit = β1 ftit + β2twit + κ′Zit + δt + ωi + ηit (4)
Hit designates three different measures of working hours (actual, contracted, and pre-
ferred hours, respectively), ft flexi-time, tw telehomework, and Z a vector of control
variables. δt represents time effects, ωi is the individual-specific, and ηit the idiosyn-
cratic error term. β and κ are (vectors of ) parameters to be estimated. Again we estimate
the model with a fixed-effects specification for the total, male, and female samples.13
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the individual employee. The data would sup-
port the hypothesis if the beta coefficients are positive and significantly different from
zero.
Table 8 presents the parameter estimates of flexi-time and telehomework on working
hours per week. According to our estimations, the flexi-time coefficients are statistically
insignificant except for males with respect to actual hours (0.555). This would imply an
increase in actual hours of 33 min per week (i.e. 0.555 h/week * 60 min/h).
The coefficients on telehomework are positive, but only significantly different from zero
with respect to actual hours for all samples and for female employees with respect to con-
tracted hours. The estimates indicate an increase in actual hours of around 55 min in
actual working hours per week for the total sample. This would translate into an increase
of 2.7 % in actual hours (50 min relative to 33.63 mean actual hours in the sample).
For female employees, the coefficient suggests an increase of 66 min/week. For the male
sub-sample, the coefficient indicates an increase of some 41 min/week. These findings
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Table 8 TLF arrangements on working hours
Actual hours Contracted hours Preferred hours
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Flexi-time 0.223 0.555* −0.189 −0.094 0.151 −0.396 −0.055 0.269 −0.484
(0.208) (0.278) (0.307) (0.153) (0.183) (0.247) (0.186) (0.255) (0.266)
Telehomework 0.920** 0.681* 1.103** 0.291 0.010 0.501* 0.366 0.183 0.474
(0.218) (0.298) (0.312) (0.150) (0.182) (0.241) (0.199) (0.275) (0.281)
Observations 14,046 7325 6721 16,022 8299 7723 16,022 8299 7723
Individuals 6409 3333 3076 7164 3681 3483 7164 3681 3483
Note: Parameter estimates of TLF arrangements on working hours. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at employee level).
See Table 13 in the Appendix for the full-specification
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
generally fit in with previous research, which found a positive association between tele-
homework and overtime (Noonan and Glass 2012; Peters and van der Lippe 2007; Peters
et al. 2009).
In general, the estimates from Eq. 4 are in line with the results obtained from the corre-
lation of residuals. Our results are therefore not sensitive to either specification, and both
estimation strategies show that the association between TLF arrangements and hours
worked is generally small.
5 Sensitivity analyses
These baseline estimates imply no significant association between TLF andworking hours
except for a positive association between flexi-time and actual hours for males as well as
telehomework and actual hours for both males and females. There is also a positive asso-
ciation between telehomework and contracted hours for females. All of the associations
are roughly in the range of half an hour to 1 h of working time per week.
Until now we did not include wage per hour in our specifications, even though wage is a
potentially important factor in the relationship between TLF and working hours, because
employees may trade wage instead of leisure for more flexibility (see Eqs. 1 and 2). The
classic interpretation in labour economics is that more flexibility and control for employ-
ees implies compensating wage differentials, assuming that it provides utility to employ-
ees but costs to employers (Altonji and Paxson 1988; Baughman et al. 2003; Heywood
et al. 2007. TLF may, however, also provide (net) benefits to employers, e.g. through
higher employee productivity (e.g. Bloom et al. 2015), effort, and (employer-oriented)
flexibility, or lower turnover, costs for office space, and absenteeism (Possenriede et al.
2014). Most previous empirical analyses regarding the TLF-wage relationship indeed
seem to suggest that the net effect of TLF on wages is either absent or positive (e.g.
Anderson et al. 2003; Bonke et al. 2004; Gariety and Shaffer 2001; Johnson and Provan
1995; Lowen and Sicilian 2009).
Due to the so-called division bias (Borjas 1980), we cannot just add wage as an inde-
pendent variable to Eq. 4.14 We therefore instrument wage with lagged wage from the
previous wave and add this to Eq. 4.15 This leads to a significant drop in sample size but
gives similar results compared to the baseline specifications nevertheless (see Table 9,
panel 1). The coefficients are even virtually the same when we compare the specification
with wage included with the baseline specification with wage excluded both estimated on
the same reduced sample (not shown). This means that the inclusion of wage does not








Table 9 TLF arrangements on working hours—robustness checks
Actual hours Contracted hours Preferred hours
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Instrumented wage included
Flexi-time 0.603* 1.104** 0.078 0.259 0.422* 0.077 0.236 0.390 −0.091
(0.240) (0.327) (0.351) (0.162) (0.179) (0.281) (0.228) (0.333) (0.294)
Telehomework 0.853** 0.769* 0.866* 0.244 0.075 0.397 0.224 0.085 0.413
(0.245) (0.309) (0.389) (0.165) (0.182) (0.298) (0.220) (0.314) (0.305)
Observations 6771 3581 3190 6779 3583 3196 6779 3583 3196
Individuals 2245 1174 1071 2246 1174 1072 2246 1174 1072
Lagged values flexi-time and telehomework as IV
Flexi-time −0.963 −0.543 −1.326 −0.169 −1.211 −0.006 −0.756 −2.334 0.080
(1.682) (2.143) (2.859) (1.338) (1.559) (2.473) (1.807) (2.419) (3.073)
Telehomework −0.758 1.440 −0.698 −1.894 −2.173 −0.518 −1.704 −1.952 −0.619
(1.944) (3.112) (2.380) (1.289) (2.126) (1.536) (1.668) (3.116) (1.813)
Observations 7696 4059 3637 7706 4062 3644 7706 4062 3644
Individuals 2517 1309 1208 2518 1309 1209 2518 1309 1209
Lagged values flexi-time and telehomework
Flexi-timet-1 0.095 0.136 0.139 −0.028 0.059 −0.001 0.047 0.216 −0.011
(0.192) (0.236) (0.305) (0.152) (0.167) (0.265) (0.212) (0.274) (0.330)
Telehomeworkt-1 0.086 −0.162 0.103 0.249 0.208 0.087 0.214 0.165 0.106
(0.250) (0.312) (0.399) (0.165) (0.208) (0.262) (0.219) (0.307) (0.317)
Observations 9370 4927 4443 9385 4933 4452 9385 4933 4452
Individuals 4191 2177 2014 4197 2180 2017 4197 2180 2017
Winsored working hours
Flexi-time 0.184 0.464 −0.162 −0.126 0.087 −0.383 −0.088 0.182 −0.440








Table 9 TLF arrangements on working hours—robustness checks (Continuation)
Telehomework 0.944** 0.723* 1.098** 0.271 −0.024 0.495* 0.302 0.121 0.403
(0.216) (0.293) (0.311) (0.146) (0.174) (0.238) (0.186) (0.258) (0.261)
Observations 14046 7325 6721 16022 8299 7723 16022 8299 7723
Individuals 6409 3333 3076 7164 3681 3483 7164 3681 3483
2004–2012 only
Flexi-time 0.223 0.555* −0.189 −0.008 0.192 −0.256 0.041 0.284 −0.312
(0.208) (0.278) (0.307) (0.168) (0.202) (0.270) (0.200) (0.273) (0.284)
Telehomework 0.920** 0.681* 1.103** 0.199 −0.089 0.438 0.215 −0.141 0.573*
(0.218) (0.298) (0.312) (0.155) (0.192) (0.248) (0.202) (0.274) (0.292)
Observations 14046 7325 6721 14046 7325 6721 14046 7325 6721
Individuals 6409 3333 3076 6409 3333 3076 6409 3333 3076
Note: Parameter estimates of TLF arrangements on working hours. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at employee level)
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
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More generally, our estimates do not allow for drawing strong conclusions about the
causal effect of flexi-time and telehomework on labour supply, however. This is due to
the following issues. Self-selection and other sources of endogeneity, like common shocks
that may at the same time influence the availability and usage of TLF on the one hand
and the number of working hours on the other, may bias our estimates. Many employ-
ees may for example choose working hours and working conditions simultaneously as
parts of a whole employment package at the start of a contract.17 Time-varying fam-
ily commitments like elderly care or the birth of a (second) child may lead to both
decreases in hours worked and higher demand for TLF. Employers may also award
TLF to employees with the largest productivity, status, or authority (cf. Golden 2009;
Winder 2009; Noonan and Glass 2012). Since we control for changes in employment
as well as for time-fixed-effects, both of these confounding factors are only relevant,
however, if they are time-varying and independent of promotions and job switches for
example.
Underlying the specification as depicted by Eq. 4 is furthermore that the idiosyncratic
error term it is strictly exogenous, i.e. that time-varying unobserved variables from any
time periodmay not be correlated with any of the explanatory variables from all time peri-
ods. This assumption would be violated for example, if there were reverse causality or a
feedback mechanism going on. This might be the case for TLF, because instead of being a
policy for improved working conditions and work-life fit, employees might get more TLF,
when (actual) working hours and workloads increase in order to get the job done (Noonan
and Glass 2012). This means that causality would run from increased hours to TLF and
not the other way around. Prior research has indeed shown that employees at the high
end of the hour spectrum have considerably more access to flexi-time for example than
those with a standard 40-h working week. Part-time employees, however, enjoy greater
availability than full-time employees as well, so access to TLF seems to actually be U-
shaped in working hours (Golden 2008; 2009). So there might be a feedback mechanism
that may work in both directions, which means that the overall impact on our estimates is
unclear.
We have considered the following procedures to remedy these potential issues. First,
we took alternative estimation techniques like differences in differences or regression
discontinuity into account. Unfortunately, these cannot be applied, because there is no
exogenous variation in the availability of schedule and location flexibility during the
period under consideration and there is no exogenous variation in the dependent vari-
ables either. The closest is the Working Hours Adjustment Act, which was implemented
in 2000. Important variables for our analysis, among them the number of actual work
hours and availability of telehomework, are not available in the AAP before 2004 and
2002, respectively, however.
Next, we tried to find suitable external instrumental variables for TLF.We tested various
autonomymeasures as IVs for telehomework and flexi-time such as “I can determine how
I do my job”, “I can determine my work speed”, or “I can determine in which order I do my
work”, for instance. All of these variables turned out to be weak instruments in the fixed-
effects specification, however, and would therefore lead to inconsistent estimates. Hence,
we were not able to find any suitable external instrumental variables in our data.
We were able to use flexi-time and telehomework from the previous wave as internal
instruments. This again leads to a significant drop in sample size, because only those
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respondents with observations from at least two subsequent waves can be used. All coef-
ficients indicate no significant association between TLF and working hours (see Table 9,
panel 2).
Next we experimented with the inclusion of lags of flexi-time and telehomework to take
possible adjustment lags into account. Again, the results indicate a significant drop in
sample size and no significant association between TLF and working hours (panel 3).
We also winsorised the working hour variables to the 1st and 99th percentile, lim-
iting the range to 3 to 60 h per week, to rule out that outliers may be driving our
results. In addition, we excluded the 2002 wave from our sample, since the answer
categories for the frequency of telehomework, on which our telehomework variable ulti-
mately relies, differ in this wave, and to rule out that the differences in effects with
respect to actual, contracted, and preferred is merely caused by differences in data avail-
ability. Most coefficients in these two specifications are statistically insignificant, and
where they are significant, the results are comparable to the baseline estimates (panels 4
and 5).18
As a next step, we also estimated Eq. 4 with various interactions (see Table 10). First,
we estimated the model with an interaction between flexi-time and telework. This inter-
action is statistically insignificant in all of the specifications tested, which means that
schedule and location flexibility are independent types of flexibility (panel 1). Second, we
respectively interacted flexi-time and telehomework with whether or not there are chil-
dren at home or whether the individual is below or above the median age of 42 years.
One may assume that these groups differ in their preferences for TLF and their propen-
sity to adjust working hours (panels 2 and 3). Third, we created indicator variables for
white-collar workers (i.e. employees with a “higher” or “scientific” level of occupation) and
service sector jobs (i.e. those in business services, other services, government and educa-
tion sectors, as opposed to agriculture, industry, construction, trade, gastronomy, repair,
transport, care, and welfare). For both these groups, we may assume that they have better
access to TLF and can more easily adjust working hours. We interact both variables with
flexi-time and telehomework, respectively (panels 4 and 5). Finally, we added an interac-
tion between flexi-time and telehomework and whether or not the wave is post 2008 to
account for possible effects due to the Great Recession.
While the occasional coefficient of these interactionsmay be significantly different from
zero, the bigger picture is that the above-mentioned interactions are generally not signif-
icant and that the main effects are quite similar to the baseline specification. This means
that according to our estimates there seem to be little to no differences in the associations
between TLF and the supply of working hours for different groups of employees.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyse the effect of temporal and locational flexibility of work (TLF) on
the number of working hours using Dutch household panel data spanning the period from
2002 to 2012. We test the claim that more TLF is associated with an increase in labour
supply due to a better fit between work and private life. An increase of TLF has been a
common policy recommendation to boost labour supply in order to enhance economic
growth and to prevent labour force shortages in the future.
According to our estimates, the general association between TLF and the number








Table 10 TLF arrangements on working hours—robustness checks: interaction
Actual hours Contracted hours Preferred hours
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Interaction between flexi-time and telehomework
Flexi-time 0.189 0.547 −0.262 −0.053 0.205 −0.374 −0.017 0.348 −0.493
(0.222) (0.298) (0.329) (0.166) (0.198) (0.271) (0.197) (0.272) (0.282)
Telehomework 0.817* 0.653 0.922 0.408 0.193 0.552 0.475 0.450 0.453
(0.340) (0.480) (0.476) (0.222) (0.287) (0.329) (0.291) (0.439) (0.380)
Flexi-time × telehomework 0.169 0.042 0.345 −0.201 −0.281 −0.104 −0.188 −0.411 0.043
(0.399) (0.541) (0.574) (0.253) (0.313) (0.400) (0.336) (0.493) (0.461)
Interaction between flexi-time, telehomework, and median age
Flexi-time 0.213 0.796 −0.371 −0.192 0.239 −0.668 −0.152 0.231 −0.604
(0.337) (0.435) (0.504) (0.247) (0.279) (0.406) (0.285) (0.376) (0.415)
Telehomework 1.198** 0.584 1.569** 0.347 −0.055 0.491 0.422 0.300 0.283
(0.368) (0.512) (0.510) (0.245) (0.297) (0.392) (0.310) (0.411) (0.445)
>Median age 0.644* 0.225 1.092** 1.043** 0.546 1.496** 0.928** 0.335 1.541**
(0.288) (0.403) (0.390) (0.226) (0.278) (0.342) (0.265) (0.355) (0.376)
Flexi-time × > median age 0.009 −0.376 0.313 0.171 −0.143 0.498 0.168 0.058 0.223
(0.363) (0.484) (0.532) (0.266) (0.300) (0.446) (0.320) (0.420) (0.473)
Telehomework × > med age −0.447 0.138 −0.829 −0.111 0.100 −0.096 −0.109 −0.175 0.218
(0.420) (0.579) (0.580) (0.271) (0.319) (0.443) (0.356) (0.455) (0.546)
Interaction between flexi-time, telehomework, and child(ren) at home
Flexi-time 0.141 0.668 −0.299 0.025 0.484 −0.263 −0.185 0.321 −0.661
(0.330) (0.448) (0.478) (0.247) (0.314) (0.386) (0.308) (0.446) (0.416)
Telehomework 0.500 0.326 0.505 −0.061 −0.272 −0.063 0.094 0.107 −0.078
(0.384) (0.539) (0.540) (0.257) (0.347) (0.376) (0.300) (0.429) (0.419)
Child(ren) −1.292** 0.036 −2.519** −0.927** 0.563 −2.300** −0.880** 0.301 −1.988**
(0.308) (0.398) (0.464) (0.263) (0.319) (0.394) (0.295) (0.421) (0.398)
Flexi-time × child(ren) 0.142 −0.176 0.171 −0.190 −0.541 −0.222 0.217 −0.084 0.282
(0.365) (0.492) (0.532) (0.279) (0.358) (0.423) (0.333) (0.478) (0.458)
Telehomework × child(ren) 0.666 0.536 0.992 0.554 0.417 0.927* 0.430 0.114 0.904
(0.415) (0.589) (0.583) (0.292) (0.383) (0.443) (0.359) (0.509) (0.504)
Interaction between flexi-time, telehomework, and white collar worker
Flexi-time 0.247 0.387 0.043 −0.019 0.150 −0.225 0.166 0.341 −0.079








Table 10 TLF arrangements on working hours—robustness checks: interaction (Continuation)
Telehomework 0.794* 0.812 0.577 0.246 0.059 0.314 0.365 0.636 −0.143
(0.318) (0.477) (0.414) (0.233) (0.312) (0.358) (0.300) (0.437) (0.402)
White collar 0.492 0.249 0.500 0.475* 0.368 0.471 0.539 0.483 0.474
(0.279) (0.379) (0.405) (0.223) (0.282) (0.335) (0.276) (0.386) (0.388)
Flexi-time × white collar −0.003 0.487 −0.622 −0.125 0.102 −0.442 −0.515 −0.127 −1.097*
(0.320) (0.418) (0.493) (0.246) (0.293) (0.409) (0.291) (0.402) (0.428)
Telehomework × white collar 0.218 −0.222 0.949 0.078 −0.088 0.325 −0.004 −0.736 1.020*
(0.373) (0.524) (0.526) (0.268) (0.335) (0.433) (0.353) (0.491) (0.499)
Interaction between flexi-time, telehomework, and service-sector jobs
Flexi-time 0.205 0.639 −0.399 −0.194 0.266 −0.739* −0.071 0.403 −0.663*
(0.264) (0.350) (0.389) (0.195) (0.241) (0.309) (0.237) (0.347) (0.312)
Telehomework 1.094** 0.974* 1.150** 0.487* 0.077 0.862** 0.520* 0.331 0.668
(0.307) (0.441) (0.400) (0.213) (0.272) (0.324) (0.264) (0.375) (0.366)
Services 0.566 0.284 0.874 0.259 0.351 0.155 0.270 0.319 0.197
(0.344) (0.417) (0.552) (0.291) (0.341) (0.481) (0.333) (0.435) (0.499)
Flexi-time × services 0.088 −0.190 0.563 0.218 −0.276 0.809 0.046 −0.297 0.466
(0.374) (0.481) (0.569) (0.279) (0.339) (0.448) (0.341) (0.456) (0.500)
Telehomework × services −0.336 −0.572 −0.066 −0.355 −0.179 −0.571 −0.275 −0.289 −0.282
(0.406) (0.561) (0.570) (0.279) (0.333) (0.463) (0.366) (0.469) (0.577)
Interaction between flexi-time, telehomework, and post 2008
Flexi-time 0.346 0.656* −0.135 −0.108 0.127 −0.444 −0.080 0.300 −0.656*
(0.223) (0.288) (0.335) (0.163) (0.197) (0.264) (0.192) (0.256) (0.283)
Telehomework 0.828** −0.583 0.974** 0.236 −0.026 0.404 0.304 0.154 0.341
(0.247) (0.345) (0.346) (0.169) (0.212) (0.267) (0.219) (0.305) (0.306)
Post 2008 −0.056 −0.340 0.031 −0.142 −0.167 −0.264 −0.439* −0.644* −0.353
(0.200) (0.279) (0.284) (0.162) (0.214) (0.240) (0.210) (0.302) (0.294)
Flexi-time × post 2008 −0.338 −0.253 −0.184 0.042 0.104 0.097 0.093 −0.074 0.468
(0.224) (0.293) (0.329) (0.183) (0.220) (0.288) (0.237) (0.318) (0.349)
Telehomework × post 2008 0.267 0.264 0.366 0.150 0.092 0.262 0.109 −0.003 0.284
(0.292) (0.402) (0.413) (0.212) (0.233) (0.351) (0.306) (0.411) (0.441)
Observations 14046 8299 6721 16022 8299 7723 16022 8299 7723
Individuals 6409 3681 3076 7164 3681 3483 7164 3681 3483
Note: Parameter estimates of TLF arrangements on working hours. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at employee level)
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
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positively associated with actual hours and our results indicate an increase of an hour per
week. Contracted and preferred working hours are generally not affected significantly by
telehomework, except for a small positive association between telehomework and con-
tracted hours for females. Telehomework therefore does not seem to be associated with a
structural increase in contracted nor preferred working hours but seems to be primarily
associated with an increase in actual working hours.
At least part of the positive effect of telehomework on actual hours seems to be driven
by an increase in unpaid overtime hours. Preliminary estimates indicate that unpaid over-
time hours increase by 1.5 h per week for male employees and 0.75 h per week for female
employees who work at home at least once a week.19 This suggests that TLF may also be
used for work intensification and an increase in overtime hours, a result that has been
discussed before (Noonan and Glass 2012; Peters and van der Lippe 2007). An alterna-
tive interpretation is that employees may reciprocate TLF availability by exerting extra
effort (Akerlof 1982; Kelliher and Anderson 2010). Previous findings that TLF increases
job satisfaction (Possenriede and Plantenga 2014) and job performance (Baltes et al. 1999;
Bloom et al. 2015; Eaton 2003; Gajendran and Harrison 2007; Hill et al. 1998) support this
interpretation. Both explanations, i.e. telehomework as a means for employers to inten-
sify work on the one hand and more work effort from employees in exchange for more
flexibility on the other, may nevertheless apply, particularly at different ends of the job
spectrum.
With respect to flexi-time, the results are even more limited. Almost all coefficients are
statistically insignificant at the 5 %-level except for a small positive association between
flexi-time and actual hours for males. Flexi-time therefore does not seem to be associated
with an increase in hours worked.
Overall, we cannot convincingly reject the null hypothesis of no effect of TLF on work-
ing hours. Even though we do find some small, positive associations between TLF and
working hours here and there, the bigger picture is that after considering and controlling
for mitigating factors, such as preferences, job, and household characteristics, the asso-
ciation between TLF and working hours vanishes (almost) completely. In addition, our
sensitivity analyses do not reveal systematic differences in the associations between TLF
and working hours for different groups. So there is no convincing evidence to support the
claim that more schedule and location flexibility leads to a larger supply of working hours
in general.
The merits of this study are that we consider two TLF arrangements, namely flexi-time
and telehomework, at the same time and that we utilised data spanning 12 years from
different sectors. The results further indicate the importance of controlling for unob-
served heterogeneity in jobs and individuals in these types of analyses. A limitation of
our study is that we cannot completely rule out endogeneity and reverse causality and
therefore do not identify a true causal effect. Since the association between TLF andwork-
ing hours after controlling for several individual and job-related factors turns out to be
almost absent, this does not seem to be a major issue, however. Future research could
extend this analysis with other TLF arrangements, like self-scheduling or working time
accounts.
Overall, the hypothesis that more temporal and locational flexibility of work leads
to an increase in hours worked appears to be rejected. The findings suggest that TLF
does not have significant effects on labour supply at the intensive margin with the
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exception of telehomework and actual hours. This implies that the arguments regarding
increases in labour supply in the debate about policy support for TLF are not empir-
ically supported. This does not take away that there may be other good reasons to
support policies for more TLF, e.g. higher productivity (Bloom et al. 2015), increased job
satisfaction and working-time fit (Possenriede and Plantenga 2014), and less absenteeism
(Possenriede et al. 2014).
Endnotes
1Every employee who has worked for a company with ten ormore employees for at least
one year can request a working hours adjustment. This right can be exercised once a year.
The employer may only dismiss a request if it is a severe impediment to business interest.
The Working Hours Adjustment Act (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur) has been effective
since mid 2000. Equal treatment of part-time and full-time employees with respect to
employment conditions is furthermore stipulated in the Equal TreatmentWorking Hours
Act (Wet verbod op onderscheid naar arbeidsduur), effective since 1996.
2Flexible working times may also induce employees to travel to work earlier and leave
from work later to avoid traffic congestion, increasing work duration as a result (Arnott
et al. 1993; Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren 2010).
3Predictions differ depending on whether one distinguishes between monetary and
time costs of commuting, whether workdays, daily and total hours are allowed to vary,
and whether one considers a static or dynamic approach (See e.g. Manning 2003;
Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren 2010; Black et al. 2014).
4The amount of commuting time is exaggerated in the figure for better visibility.
5We assume here that individuals are able to choose their preferred levels of con-
sumption and leisure without any other constraints of course. In addition, a decrease in
commuting costs and thus a shift in the budget constraint to the right reduces the size of
the kink in the budget line. This reduction of the fixed costs of work not only increases
labour supply at the intensive margin, but also induces non-working individuals to par-
ticipate and thus raises labour force participation as well (e.g. Oi 1976; Cogan 1981; Black
et al. 2014). Since Dutch labour participation rates are relatively high already, though, we
focus on the effects on hours worked in this study.
6Note that this model also captures workers who do not have binding private schedule
constraints in the above sense, but just a preference for work at certain intervals, e.g. due
to certain life-style choices. Nevertheless the degree to which private schedule constraints
are binding certainly differs between workers and depends inter alia on whether they
have care responsibilities or not.
7The panel formerly known as the OSA Labour Supply Panel is now conducted on
behalf of the Social Cultureel Planbureau (http://www.scp.nl/english/). The data and its
documentation are in Dutch.
8While the question refers to work at home and not explicitly to telework, it is the
first question in the section titled “telework” in the survey. In addition, only 2.1 %
of the respondents who work at home do not use ICT. Hence we label this variable
telehomework.
9Telehomeworkers were asked how often they were working at home on average. From
2004 onwards the answer categories were less than once per month, less than twice per
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month, once per week or twice or more often per week. We only count the latter two
categories as telehomeworkers. In 2002 the answer categories were once permonth, twice
per month, three times per month, more than three times per month. We include only
the latter as telehomeworkers.
10A superscript to indicate the different outcome variables is omitted.
11We estimated the model with a random-effects specification as well. The crucial
assumption of a random-effects specification, however, is that the individual-specific
error term αi is not correlated with the right-hand side variables Zit , otherwise the
estimated coefficients will be biased. Since the availability and usage of TLF and the num-
ber of working hours quite likely depend on various job and individual characteristics
this assumption seems rather strong. The random-effects specification was thus firmly
rejected by a Hausman specification test in favour of the fixed-effects specification for all
models and (sub-)samples considered.
12Note that since the flexi-time and telehomework indicators are binary, we effectively
estimate linear probability models for these TLF variables. We do not control for the
other TLF arrangement in these models (i.e. flexi-time is not controlled for in the tele-
homework regression and vice versa). The linear probability models for flexi-time behave
well, as no observations are predicted outside the unit-interval. For telehomework, only
4.4 %, 12.8 %, and 9.3 % of the observations are predicted outside the unit-interval for the
total, male, and female sample respectively.
13The random-effects specification was again firmly rejected by a Hausman specifica-
tion test for all samples.
14The division bias refers to the fact that hourly wages are calculated by dividing net
wages per month by hours per month. This causes measurement error in hours to enter
both sides of Eq. 4 and results in a spurious negative correlation between wages and
hours.
15We use the same control variables as in the baseline specification in this and all
following specifications in this paragraph.
16In their study on labour supply and commuting, Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van
Ommeren (2010) also find that the inclusion of an instrumented wage variable does not
affect their results.
17Note however that more than half of the employees for which TLF status changes
have no change in their employment status. This indicates that a considerable share of
employees in our sample does not seem to make these choices simultaneously.
18It might seem desirable to estimate this model on the sub-sample of part-time work-
ing (female) employees as well. Part-time employment may be an alternative strategy to
combine work and private life and one thus might expect the largest effects of schedule
and location flexibility here. Empirically, this is incorrect, however, because one would
select the sample on the dependent variable and thus get biased estimates. Furthermore
we are interested in the net effect of TLF, not just the effect on part-timers. Given the dis-
tribution of working hours across gender in the Netherlands, i.e. male employees mostly
working full-time and female employees mostly working part-time, one could interpret
gender as a proxy for part-time/full-time employment, however.
19We estimated a model like Eq. 4 on paid and unpaid overtime hours. These results
are only indicative, however, due to the large number of employees with zero overtime









Table 11 Control variables on working hours
Actual hours Contracted hours Preferred hours
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Age -0.019 -0.133* 0.127* 0.004 -0.080 0.108** 0.134** 0.114* 0.167**
(0.040) (0.057) (0.056) (0.029) (0.042) (0.041) (0.037) (0.056) (0.049)
Marital status
Ref: Married
Cohabiting 0.909 -0.356 2.244** 0.707 -0.491 1.912** 0.488 -0.530 1.487*
(0.491) (0.559) (0.770) (0.374) (0.362) (0.608) (0.459) (0.573) (0.697)
Single 1.114 -1.676* 3.100** 1.090* -0.268 2.207** 1.793** 0.594 2.807**
(0.699) (0.814) (1.001) (0.548) (0.449) (0.852) (0.597) (0.585) (0.911)
Child(ren) -1.063** 0.111 -2.238** -0.886** 0.390 -2.185** -0.689** 0.302 -1.703**
(0.257) (0.306) (0.403) (0.207) (0.224) (0.334) (0.249) (0.326) (0.358)
Education
Ref: Primary School
Lower secondary 1.543 0.850 2.029 0.961 0.295 1.841 1.118 0.720 1.434
(1.006) (1.224) (1.722) (0.836) (1.038) (1.320) (0.943) (1.245) (1.263)
Higher secondary 2.126* 0.754 3.462 1.438 0.438 2.775* 1.950* 1.147 2.823*
(1.077) (1.312) (1.820) (0.878) (1.083) (1.393) (0.988) (1.303) (1.338)
Vocational college 4.418** 2.623 6.191** 3.118** 1.610 4.957** 3.237** 1.957 4.572**
(1.180) (1.447) (1.965) (0.963) (1.182) (1.535) (1.064) (1.387) (1.490)
Academic 4.864** 3.086 6.512** 3.742** 1.904 6.001** 4.233** 2.608 6.088**
(1.356) (1.661) (2.274) (1.098) (1.312) (1.810) (1.190) (1.508) (1.772)
Work experience 0.008 -0.006 0.009 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.017 -0.021 -0.021
(0.028) (0.042) (0.039) (0.019) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.039) (0.033)
Permanent contract 0.873** 0.604 1.005* 0.599* 0.664 0.407 -0.020 -0.118 -0.049








Table 11 Control variables on working hours (Continuation)
Empl. status change 0.222 -0.256 0.645** 0.092 -0.170 0.314 0.093 -0.107 0.228
(0.158) (0.223) (0.217) (0.118) (0.157) (0.171) (0.146) (0.213) (0.196)
2nd job -0.913* -1.045 -1.015 -1.419** -1.808** -1.285* -1.202** -1.541* -1.116
(0.448) (0.716) (0.563) (0.403) (0.565) (0.551) (0.423) (0.604) (0.579)
Supervised employees
Ref: None
1-9 employees 1.192** 0.929** 1.434** 0.542** 0.331 0.715** 0.385* 0.151 0.651*
(0.213) (0.253) (0.348) (0.152) (0.170) (0.263) (0.180) (0.231) (0.278)
10-49 employees 2.006** 1.917** 2.000** 0.672** 0.465 0.876 0.722* 0.773* 0.443
(0.376) (0.423) (0.697) (0.248) (0.264) (0.490) (0.302) (0.352) (0.556)
50 or more employees 3.045** 3.113** 2.506 1.397 1.472* 0.935 1.253 2.165** -1.722
(0.805) (0.866) (1.683) (0.717) (0.600) (2.005) (0.875) (0.771) (2.327)
Occupational level
Ref: Medium
Elementary -1.711** -2.418** -1.180 -1.197* -1.759** -0.627 -1.138* -1.750** -0.588
(0.606) (0.810) (0.943) (0.488) (0.594) (0.813) (0.520) (0.591) (0.904)
Lower -0.687** -0.613* -0.572 -0.556** -0.631** -0.330 -0.195 -0.189 -0.086
(0.205) (0.275) (0.297) (0.169) (0.219) (0.249) (0.206) (0.309) (0.273)
Higher 0.439* 0.365 0.368 0.332* 0.289 0.300 0.230 0.221 0.153
(0.195) (0.255) (0.304) (0.157) (0.192) (0.255) (0.191) (0.246) (0.296)
Scientific 0.446 0.731 -0.160 0.430* 0.561* 0.152 0.270 0.297 0.220
(0.331) (0.415) (0.548) (0.212) (0.264) (0.351) (0.284) (0.348) (0.486)
Sector
Ref: Agriculture
Industry 0.585 -1.488 4.033 1.481 -0.158 4.651 0.543 -0.868 3.300
(1.414) (1.277) (2.298) (1.066) (0.631) (2.407) (1.064) (0.874) (2.223)
Construction 0.672 -1.236 3.563 2.426* 0.869 5.346* 1.143 -0.109 3.273








Table 11 Control variables on working hours (Continuation)
Trade, gastronomy, repair -0.329 -2.239 3.270 0.687 -0.859 4.019 -0.037 -1.355 2.771
(1.443) (1.315) (2.348) (1.091) (0.663) (2.439) (1.087) (0.928) (2.217)
Transport 1.232 -1.174 6.029* 1.863 -0.480 7.176** 0.557 -1.193 4.303
(1.549) (1.466) (2.669) (1.216) (0.886) (2.740) (1.218) (1.104) (2.519)
Business services 0.946 -1.574 5.408* 1.856 0.101 5.490* 0.774 -0.642 3.686
(1.431) (1.271) (2.390) (1.071) (0.638) (2.440) (1.075) (0.877) (2.258)
Care, Welfare 1.132 -2.315 5.693* 1.737 -1.029 5.751* 1.100 -1.355 4.539*
(1.480) (1.405) (2.436) (1.143) (0.876) (2.512) (1.157) (1.179) (2.308)
Other services 0.550 -2.198 5.276* 0.957 -0.975 4.693 0.256 -1.449 3.464
(1.479) (1.421) (2.409) (1.130) (0.795) (2.514) (1.169) (1.117) (2.332)
Government 0.820 -1.493 4.893* 1.114 -0.677 4.641 0.695 -0.945 3.706
(1.435) (1.317) (2.431) (1.089) (0.723) (2.473) (1.099) (0.958) (2.280)
Education 3.385* 0.211 8.378** 3.113* 0.392 7.588** 2.172 -0.972 6.575**
(1.618) (1.732) (2.588) (1.232) (1.002) (2.612) (1.269) (1.237) (2.454)
No. of employees (/1000) 0.028 0.057 -0.023 0.012 0.031 -0.015 0.023 0.036 0.012
(0.027) (0.030) (0.053) (0.020) (0.022) (0.046) (0.028) (0.031) (0.063)
Constant 29.244** 44.843** 10.543** 26.949** 38.964** 11.790** 21.937** 30.435** 11.183**
(2.238) (2.588) (3.593) (1.736) (1.809) (3.259) (1.965) (2.505) (3.215)
Observations 14046 7325 6721 16022 8299 7723 16022 8299 7723
Individuals 6409 3333 3076 7164 3681 3483 7164 3681 3483
Note: Parameter estimates of control variables only on working hours. Year (wave) dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at employee level)








Table 12 Control variables on TLF arrangements
Flexi-time Telehomework
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Age 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.006** 0.005 0.008**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Marital status
Ref: Married
Cohabiting -0.049 -0.054 -0.043 -0.024 -0.060 0.011
(0.026) (0.040) (0.034) (0.021) (0.031) (0.029)
Single -0.056 -0.101 -0.021 -0.038 -0.096* 0.009
(0.033) (0.056) (0.038) (0.024) (0.043) (0.028)
Child(ren) 0.024 0.036 0.013 0.030* 0.050** 0.008
(0.015) (0.023) (0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
Education
Ref: Primary School
Lower secondary -0.012 0.037 -0.130 -0.021 0.003 -0.074
(0.039) (0.038) (0.081) (0.022) (0.026) (0.038)
Higher secondary -0.033 0.027 -0.161 -0.013 0.010 -0.062
(0.042) (0.042) (0.088) (0.024) (0.031) (0.038)
Vocational college -0.018 0.037 -0.138 -0.007 0.068 -0.116*
(0.048) (0.052) (0.093) (0.031) (0.042) (0.046)
Academic -0.023 -0.005 -0.094 0.017 0.051 -0.036
(0.056) (0.067) (0.101) (0.046) (0.061) (0.070)
Work experience -0.000 0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Permanent contract 0.020 -0.004 0.039 0.008 -0.000 0.012








Table 12 Control variables on TLF arrangements (Continuation)
Empl. status change 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.014
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
2nd job 0.009 -0.012 0.021 -0.011 -0.050 0.013
(0.021) (0.034) (0.027) (0.018) (0.033) (0.021)
Supervised employees
Ref: None
1-9 employees 0.034* 0.019 0.057** 0.028* 0.016 0.040*
(0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018)
10-49 employees 0.059** 0.065* 0.042 0.047* 0.017 0.089*
(0.022) (0.029) (0.034) (0.021) (0.025) (0.035)
50 or more employees 0.022 0.030 -0.008 0.056 0.038 0.056
(0.046) (0.055) (0.081) (0.046) (0.055) (0.080)
Occupational level
Ref: Medium
Elementary -0.057* -0.106** 0.001 -0.001 0.016 -0.021
(0.027) (0.034) (0.043) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019)
Lower -0.044** -0.051** -0.034 -0.016 -0.014 -0.019
(0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Higher 0.019 0.021 0.014 0.006 0.001 0.012
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019)
Scientific 0.027 0.039 0.005 -0.028 -0.036 -0.013
(0.020) (0.025) (0.033) (0.020) (0.025) (0.034)
Sector
Ref: Agriculture
Industry -0.144 -0.143 -0.116 -0.032 -0.053 0.013
(0.081) (0.089) (0.181) (0.033) (0.045) (0.041)
Construction -0.137 -0.143 -0.040 -0.017 -0.034 0.030








Table 12 Control variables on TLF arrangements (Continuation)
Trade, gastronomy, repair -0.178* -0.164 -0.182 -0.003 -0.012 0.009
(0.081) (0.090) (0.175) (0.034) (0.048) (0.038)
Transport -0.137 -0.127 -0.136 -0.014 -0.018 -0.009
(0.086) (0.097) (0.181) (0.038) (0.052) (0.049)
Business services -0.123 -0.114 -0.120 -0.023 -0.043 0.008
(0.080) (0.087) (0.174) (0.032) (0.044) (0.039)
Care, Welfare -0.091 -0.088 -0.085 0.001 0.055 -0.002
(0.084) (0.098) (0.177) (0.040) (0.062) (0.044)
Other services -0.139 -0.067 -0.234 0.011 -0.004 0.037
(0.083) (0.095) (0.175) (0.040) (0.054) (0.053)
Government -0.087 -0.103 -0.053 -0.010 -0.017 0.011
(0.083) (0.092) (0.179) (0.039) (0.050) (0.056)
Education -0.145 -0.193 -0.099 -0.010 -0.096 0.069
(0.089) (0.103) (0.182) (0.047) (0.060) (0.062)
No. of employees (/1000) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Constant 0.336** 0.362* 0.374 -0.071 -0.005 -0.117
(0.115) (0.144) (0.211) (0.073) (0.105) (0.102)
Observations 16022 8299 7723 16022 8299 7723
Individuals 7164 3681 3483 7164 3681 3483
Note: Parameter estimates of control variables on flexi-time and telehomework. Year (wave) dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at employee level)








Table 13 TLF arrangements on working hours
Actual hours Contracted hours Preferred hours
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Flexi-time 0.223 0.555* -0.189 -0.094 0.151 -0.396 -0.055 0.269 -0.484
(0.208) (0.278) (0.307) (0.153) (0.183) (0.247) (0.186) (0.255) (0.266)
Telehomework 0.920** 0.681* 1.103** 0.291 0.010 0.501* 0.366 0.183 0.474
(0.218) (0.298) (0.312) (0.150) (0.182) (0.241) (0.199) (0.275) (0.281)
Age -0.029 -0.139* 0.113* 0.003 -0.080 0.106** 0.133** 0.112* 0.166**
(0.040) (0.057) (0.056) (0.029) (0.042) (0.041) (0.037) (0.056) (0.049)
Marital status
Ref: Married
Cohabiting 0.945 -0.284 2.230** 0.709 -0.483 1.890** 0.494 -0.505 1.461*
(0.489) (0.556) (0.769) (0.374) (0.363) (0.608) (0.458) (0.571) (0.697)
Single 1.154 -1.570 3.087** 1.096* -0.252 2.194* 1.804** 0.639 2.793**
(0.699) (0.810) (1.001) (0.548) (0.448) (0.854) (0.596) (0.583) (0.913)
Child(ren) -1.092** 0.061 -2.249** -0.892** 0.384 -2.183** -0.699** 0.283 -1.700**
(0.256) (0.306) (0.401) (0.207) (0.224) (0.334) (0.249) (0.324) (0.357)
Education
Ref: Primary School
Lower secondary 1.578 0.827 2.114 0.966 0.289 1.827 1.125 0.710 1.406
(1.008) (1.223) (1.716) (0.836) (1.038) (1.312) (0.942) (1.245) (1.250)
Higher secondary 2.165* 0.746 3.521 1.439 0.433 2.743* 1.952* 1.137 2.774*
(1.078) (1.310) (1.812) (0.877) (1.083) (1.383) (0.986) (1.302) (1.323)
Vocational college 4.451** 2.562 6.307** 3.119** 1.604 4.961** 3.239** 1.934 4.560**
(1.181) (1.444) (1.954) (0.963) (1.182) (1.525) (1.064) (1.387) (1.475)
Academic 4.865** 3.053 6.544** 3.735** 1.905 5.981** 4.226** 2.600 6.060**








Table 13 TLF arrangements on working hours (Continuation)
Work experience 0.009 -0.007 0.010 -0.007 -0.011 -0.012 -0.017 -0.022 -0.022
(0.028) (0.042) (0.039) (0.019) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025) (0.039) (0.033)
Permanent contract 0.862** 0.593 1.006* 0.599* 0.665 0.417 -0.022 -0.117 -0.036
(0.329) (0.465) (0.446) (0.276) (0.379) (0.380) (0.296) (0.438) (0.390)
Empl. status change 0.212 -0.271 0.637** 0.089 -0.173 0.311 0.089 -0.113 0.227
(0.158) (0.222) (0.216) (0.118) (0.157) (0.171) (0.147) (0.214) (0.196)
2nd job -0.903* -1.020 -1.013 -1.415** -1.806** -1.283* -1.197** -1.529* -1.111
(0.449) (0.716) (0.563) (0.403) (0.564) (0.551) (0.423) (0.603) (0.579)
Supervised employees
Ref: None
1-9 employees 1.155** 0.902** 1.408** 0.537** 0.328 0.717** 0.376* 0.143 0.659*
(0.213) (0.252) (0.349) (0.152) (0.170) (0.264) (0.180) (0.231) (0.279)
10-49 employees 1.965** 1.880** 1.928** 0.664** 0.455 0.848 0.708* 0.753* 0.421
(0.374) (0.420) (0.697) (0.248) (0.264) (0.491) (0.303) (0.353) (0.557)
50 or more employees 2.980** 3.047** 2.418 1.382 1.467* 0.904 1.234 2.150** -1.753
(0.802) (0.863) (1.687) (0.718) (0.601) (1.998) (0.874) (0.770) (2.320)
Occupational level
Ref: Medium
Elementary -1.700** -2.381** -1.145 -1.202* -1.744** -0.616 -1.141* -1.724** -0.577
(0.606) (0.809) (0.944) (0.488) (0.592) (0.811) (0.520) (0.593) (0.901)
Lower -0.661** -0.577* -0.547 -0.555** -0.623** -0.334 -0.191 -0.172 -0.093
(0.206) (0.276) (0.297) (0.170) (0.220) (0.250) (0.207) (0.311) (0.273)
Higher 0.426* 0.348 0.358 0.332* 0.286 0.300 0.229 0.215 0.155
(0.195) (0.255) (0.302) (0.156) (0.192) (0.254) (0.191) (0.245) (0.296)
Scientific 0.470 0.735 -0.137 0.441* 0.555* 0.161 0.282 0.293 0.229








Table 13 TLF arrangements on working hours (Continuation)
Sector
Ref: Agriculture
Industry 0.658 -1.360 3.985 1.477 -0.136 4.599 0.547 -0.819 3.238
(1.420) (1.290) (2.312) (1.065) (0.630) (2.409) (1.062) (0.871) (2.207)
Construction 0.732 -1.127 3.539 2.418* 0.891 5.315* 1.142 -0.064 3.240
(1.514) (1.399) (2.541) (1.103) (0.701) (2.708) (1.090) (0.900) (2.542)
Trade, gastronomy, repair -0.274 -2.123 3.220 0.672 -0.834 3.942 -0.046 -1.309 2.679
(1.448) (1.327) (2.363) (1.090) (0.662) (2.441) (1.085) (0.927) (2.204)
Transport 1.280 -1.096 6.021* 1.854 -0.460 7.127** 0.554 -1.156 4.242
(1.554) (1.475) (2.686) (1.215) (0.886) (2.740) (1.216) (1.100) (2.504)
Business services 1.003 -1.482 5.377* 1.851 0.118 5.439* 0.776 -0.604 3.624
(1.436) (1.282) (2.405) (1.070) (0.637) (2.442) (1.074) (0.875) (2.247)
Care, Welfare 1.177 -2.264 5.682* 1.729 -1.017 5.719* 1.095 -1.341 4.499
(1.484) (1.415) (2.451) (1.142) (0.875) (2.517) (1.155) (1.173) (2.298)
Other services 0.577 -2.157 5.181* 0.941 -0.965 4.581 0.244 -1.430 3.333
(1.484) (1.434) (2.424) (1.129) (0.795) (2.516) (1.168) (1.116) (2.320)
Government 0.867 -1.396 4.881* 1.109 -0.661 4.615 0.694 -0.914 3.675
(1.440) (1.326) (2.449) (1.088) (0.723) (2.478) (1.097) (0.956) (2.270)
Education 3.442* 0.363 8.314** 3.102* 0.422 7.515** 2.168 -0.903 6.495**
(1.620) (1.740) (2.597) (1.230) (0.999) (2.613) (1.264) (1.234) (2.436)
No. of employees (/1000) 0.024 0.055 -0.030 0.011 0.031 -0.017 0.022 0.036 0.009
(0.026) (0.029) (0.051) (0.020) (0.022) (0.045) (0.028) (0.031) (0.064)
Constant 29.352** 44.701** 10.959** 27.001** 38.909** 11.996** 21.982** 30.338** 11.419**
(2.239) (2.595) (3.592) (1.732) (1.813) (3.250) (1.961) (2.507) (3.197)
Observations 14046 7325 6721 16022 8299 7723 16022 8299 7723
Individuals 6409 3333 3076 7164 3681 3483 7164 3681 3483
Note: Parameter estimates of TLF arrangements on working hours. Year (wave) dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at employee level)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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